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Abstract:  What role does the business environment play in promoting and restraining firm 
growth? Recent literature points to a number of factors as obstacles to growth. Inefficient 
functioning of financial markets, inadequate security and enforcement of property rights, poor 
provision of infrastructure, inefficient regulation and taxation, and broader governance features 
such as corruption and macroeconomic stability are all discussed without any comparative 
evidence on their ordering. In this paper, we use firm level survey data to present evidence on the 
relative importance of different features of the business environment.  We find that although 
firms report many obstacles to growth, not all the obstacles are equally constraining. Some affect 
firm growth only indirectly through their influence on other obstacles, or not at all. Using 
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) methodology as well as regressions, we find that only obstacles 
related to Finance, Crime and Policy Instability directly affect the growth rate of firms. 
Robustness tests further show that the Finance result is the most robust of the three. These results 
have important policy implications for the  priority of  reform efforts. Our results show that 
maintaining policy stability, keeping crime under control, and undertaking financial sector 
reforms to relax financing constraints are likely to be the most effective routes to promote firm 
growth.  
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Understanding firm growth is at the heart of the development process, making it a much 
researched area in finance and economics.  More recently, the field has seen resurgence 
in interest from policymakers and researchers, with a new focus on the broader business 
environment in which firms operate.   Researchers have documented through surveys that 
firms report many features of their business environment as obstacles to their growth.  
Firms report being affected by inadequate security and enforcement of property rights, 
inefficient functioning of financial markets, poor provision of infrastructure services, 
inefficient regulations and taxation, and broader governance features such as corruption 
and macroeconomic instability. Many of these perceived obstacles are correlated with 
low performance.  
These findings can inform government policies that shape the opportunities and 
incentives facing firms, by influencing their business environment.  However, even if 
firm performance is likely to benefit from improvements in all dimensions of the business 
environment, addressing all of them at once would be challenging for any government.   
Thus, understanding how these different obstacles interact and which ones influence firm 
growth directly is important in prioritizing reform efforts. Further, since the relative 
importance of obstacles may also vary according to the level of development of the 
country and according to firm characteristics such as firm size, it is important to assess 
whether the same obstacles affect all sub-populations of firms. 
In this paper we examine which features of the business environment directly 
affect firm growth.  We use evidence from the World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES), a major firm level survey conducted by the World Bank in 1999 and 2000 in 80 
developed and developing countries around the world. We use this data to assess (i)   3
whether each feature of the business environment that firms report as an obstacle affects 
their growth, (ii) the relative economic importance of  the obstacles that do constrain firm 
growth, (iii) whether an obstacle has a direct effect on firm growth or whether the 
obstacle acts indirectly by reinforcing other obstacles which have a direct effect, and (iv) 
whether these relationships vary by different levels of economic development and 
different firm characteristics. 
We define an obstacle to be binding if it has a significant impact on firm growth.  
Our regression results indicate that out of a full set of ten different business environment 
obstacles that firms report, only Finance, Crime, and Policy Instability emerge as the 
binding constraints with a direct association with firm growth.  In order to reduce 
dimensionality of the different business environment factors in a systematic structured 
approach, we use the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) methodology implemented by an 
algorithm used in artificial intelligence and computer science (Sprites, Glymour, and 
Scheines (2000)). The DAG algorithm also confirms Finance, Crime and Policy 
Instability to be the binding constraints, with other obstacles having an indirect 
association, if at all, on firm growth through the binding constraints.  
In further robustness tests, we find that the finance result is the most robust, in 
that the Finance obstacle is binding regardless of which countries and firms are included 
in the sample. Regression analysis also shows that the Finance obstacle has the largest 
direct effect on firm growth.  These results are not due to influential observations, reverse 
causality or perception biases likely to be found in survey responses.  Policy Instability 
and Crime, the other two binding constraints in the full sample, are driven by the 
inclusion of African and Transition economies where, arguably, they might be the most   4
problematic. Instrumental variable regressions also show Finance to be the most robust 
result.  
We also find that the relative importance of different factors varies according to 
firm characteristics.  Larger firms are affected by the Finance obstacle to a significantly 
lesser extent but being larger does not relax the obstacles related to Crime or Policy 
Instability to the same extent.  
Examining the Finance obstacle in more detail, we find that although firms 
perceive many specific financing obstacles, such as lack of access to long-term capital 
and collateral requirements, only the cost of borrowing is directly associated with firm 
growth. However, we find that the cost of borrowing itself is affected by imperfections in 
the financial markets. Thus we find that the firms that face high interest rates are the ones 
that perceive banks they have access to, as being corrupt, under-funded, and requiring 
excessive paperwork. We also find that difficulties with posting collateral and limited 
access to long-term financing are also correlated with high interest rates. It is likely that 
these latter obstacles are also aggravated by underdeveloped institutions.
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  Several papers have specifically pointed to the importance of financing obstacles.  
Using firm level data, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and others provide 
evidence on the importance of the financial system and legal enforcement in relaxing 
firm’s external financing constraints and facilitating their growth.  Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) show that industries that are dependent on external finance grow faster in 
countries with better developed financial systems.
2  Although these papers investigate 
different obstacles to firm growth and their impact, they generally focus on a small subset 
of broadly characterized obstacles faced by firms.     5
Our work is most closely related to Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
(2005) but differs significantly from that study in the question being asked, the execution, 
and the findings. The focus of the Beck et al. study is to examine if the following three 
obstacles selected on a priori grounds – finance, corruption, and legal obstacles – have an 
effect on firm growth rates individually. Hence, the goal in that study is not to compare 
the obstacles to identify the most binding constraint.  This is crucial since we know from 
our study that most obstacles when entered individually as in the Beck et al. paper are 
significant in the growth regressions. Our paper also differs from the Beck et al study in 
the methodology used since their paper does not incorporate country fixed effects (or the 
DAG methodology) and has limited discussion of causality issues. 
This paper on the other hand looks at the full set of business environment 
obstacles - finance, corruption, infrastructure, taxes and regulations, judicial efficiency, 
crime, anti-competitive practices, policy instability/uncertainty, inflation and exchange 
rate - and finds finance, crime, and policy instability to be the most binding obstacles. We 
also find the financial sector result to be the most robust of the three binding obstacles 
and hence deserving of greater policy focus. Thus this paper has implications for the 
priority of reform efforts while the other paper does not, which is crucial for governments 
contemplating reform of their business environments.  
A number of qualifications need to be emphasized. First, as common in the 
literature, in our paper we take as given the existing population of firms in each country 
and study the constraints they face. However, as also described by Hausman, Rodrik, and 
Velasco (2004), it must be noted that in a more general setting the population of firms is 
itself endogenous. For example, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Makimovic (2006) show that   6
firm size distribution adapts to the business environment, and Demirguc-Kunt, Love, and 
Maksimovic (2006) show that certain organizational forms are better adapted to specific 
business environments. Nevertheless, the analysis in this paper can be seen as a way of 
identifying and targeting the most binding constraints for existing firms, conditional on 
having entered, but not necessarily identifying the constraints to entry. Second, this paper 
examines cross-country firm-level regressions and therefore does not detail the 
experience of any single country in depth. However we believe that having controlled for 
country fixed effects, we have useful - albeit not definitive - information from the cross-
country set-up on the binding constraints to firm growth. Finally in the absence of panel 
data and firm fixed effects, we have to recognize that potential reverse causality concerns 
are endemic to the growth literature. We address these issues in detail using instrumental 
variables in the robustness section of the paper.   
  The paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the methodology. 
Section II discusses the data and summary statistics.  Section III presents our main 
results.  Section IV presents the conclusions and policy implications. 
 
I. Methodology: Identification of Binding Constraints 
Numerous studies argue that differences in business environment can explain much of the 
variation across countries in firms’ financial policies and performance.  While much of 
the early work relied on country-level indicators and firms’ financial reports, more recent 
work has relied on surveys of firms which provide data on a wide range of potential 
obstacles to growth.
3    7
Given the large number of potential obstacles to growth that have been identified 
in surveys, we face a number of difficulties in identifying the obstacles that are truly 
constraining.  First, a potential problem with using survey data is that enterprise 
managers may identify several operational issues while not all of them may be 
constraining.  Therefore, we examine the extent to which reported obstacles affect growth 
rates of firms.  An obstacle is only considered to be a “constraint” or a “binding 
constraint” if it has a significant impact on firm growth.  Significant impact requires that 
the coefficient of the obstacle in the firm growth regression be significant and that the 
enterprise managers identified the factor as an obstacle.
4   
Second, to the extent that the characteristics of a firm’s business environment are 
correlated, it is likely that many perceived business environment characteristics will be 
correlated with realized firm growth. It is important to sort these into obstacles that 
directly affect growth and obstacles that may be correlated with firm growth but affect it 
only indirectly. 
Since there is no theoretical basis for classifying the obstacles, we must proceed 
empirically. To reduce dimensionality in a more structured way, we use the Directed 
Acyclic Graph (DAG) methodology. The DAG algorithm begins with a set of potentially 
related variables and uses the conditional correlations between them to rule out possible 
relations among these variables. The final output of the algorithm is a pattern of graphs 
listing potential relations between the variables that have not been ruled out and shows (i) 
variables that have direct effects on the dependent variable or other variables, (ii) 
variables that only have indirect effects on the dependent variable through other 
variables, and (iii) variables that lack a consistent statistical relation with the other   8
variables. If DAG identifies a particular obstacle as having a direct effect on firm growth, 
that obstacle would also have a significant coefficient in all OLS regressions regardless 
of which subset of other obstacles are entered as control variables in the regression 
equation. Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) further illustrate the use of 
this methodology.
5  
 We also use regression analysis to do further robustness tests, such as testing for 
possible endogeneity bias via instrumental variable methods.  We also perform other 
robustness tests, controlling for additional variables at the firm and country level, growth 
opportunities, influential observations and potential perception biases in survey responses 
using regression analysis. 
The obstacles a firm faces depend on the institutions in each country, but are not 
likely to be the same for each firm in each country. Thus, our unit of analysis is the firm. 
As described below, the regressions have country-level fixed effects.  
   
II. Data and Summary Statistics 
  The main purpose of the WBES survey is to identify obstacles to firm performance and 
growth around the world.  Thus, the survey contains a large number of questions on the 
nature and severity of different obstacles.  Specifically, firms are asked to rate the extent 
to which Finance, Corruption, Infrastructure, Taxes and Regulations, Judicial Efficiency, 
Crime, Anti-Competitive Practices, Policy Instability/Uncertainty, and macro issues such 
as Inflation and Exchange Rate constitute obstacles to their growth.
6     
  In addition to the detail on the obstacles, one of the greatest values of this survey 
is its wide coverage of smaller firms.  The survey is size-stratified, with 40 percent of   9
observations on small firms (defined as employing 5-50 employees), 40 percent on 
medium-sized firms (51-500 employees), and the remainder from large firms (>500 
employees).   
Insert Table 1 here 
  The firm level obstacles are reported in Table 1. The WBES asked enterprise 
managers to rate the extent to which each factor presented an obstacle to the operation 
and growth of their business.  A rating of one denotes no obstacle; two, a minor obstacle; 
three, a moderate obstacle; and four, a major obstacle. Panel A of Table 1 shows that 
firms in high income countries tend to face lower obstacles in all areas.  Panel B 
highlights regional differences: When it comes to Corruption and Infrastructure, African 
firms report the highest obstacles; Latin American Crime and Judicial Efficiency 
obstacles are the highest in the sample; and Financing obstacles in Asian countries are 
lowest in the sample of developing countries.  Finally, from Panel C we see that smaller 
firms face higher obstacles than larger firms in all areas, except in those related to 
Judicial Efficiency and Infrastructure, where the ranking is reversed.  
  As a measure of firm performance we use firm sales growth over the past three 
years. We prefer to use growth as a measure of performance rather than productivity 
because the productivity measures are noisier and available for a much smaller sample of 
firms. We do not have information on other performance measures such as profits. In the 
Appendix Table A.1 we report firm growth and the different obstacles that firms report, 
averaged over all firms in each country. Firm Growth is the sales growth rate for 
individual firms averaged over all sampled firms in each country. Average firm growth 
across countries shows a wide dispersion, from negative rates of 20 percent for Armenia   10
and Azerbaijan to 64 percent for Malawi and Uzbekistan. Looking at average obstacles 
across countries we see that firms report Taxes and Regulations to be their greatest 
obstacle. Inflation, Policy Instability and Financing obstacles are also reported to be 
highly constraining.  By contrast, factors associated with Judicial Efficiency and 
Infrastructure are ranked as the lowest obstacles faced by entrepreneurs. 
The correlations among the obstacles reported by firms are significant but fairly 
low, with few above 0.5 (correlation matrix not shown).  As expected, the two macro 
obstacles, Inflation and Exchange Rate, are highly correlated at 0.58.  The correlations of 
Corruption with Crime and Judicial Efficiency are also relatively high at 0.55 each, 
indicating that in environments where corruption and crime are wide-spread, judicial 
efficiency is adversely affected.  It is also interesting that the correlation between the 
Financing obstacle and all other obstacles is among the lowest, indicating that the 
Financing obstacle may capture different effects than those captured by other reported 
obstacles.   All obstacles are negatively and significantly correlated with firm growth.  
We explore these relations further in the next section. 
 
III. Firm Growth and Reported Obstacles 
In this section we explore the link between the various obstacles that firms report and 
firm growth rates using country fixed effect regressions and DAG analysis. We find that 
finance, crime, and policy instability are most significantly associated with firm growth 
suggesting that these are the binding constraints. We find our results robust to a number 
of checks including variation across different firm sizes and income levels of the 
countries, endogeneity concerns, removal of outliers and perception biases. We also find   11
that of the individual financing obstacles, high interest rates are most significantly 
associated with firm growth. The results are discussed in detail below. 
Obtaining the Binding Constraints 
In Table 2 we regress firm growth rates on the different obstacles they report.   All 
regressions are estimated with firm-level data using country-level fixed effects.
7 The 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. Specifically, the regression 
equations we estimate take the form: 
Firm Growth = α + β1 Obstacle + β2 Firm Size + Country Fixed Effects + ε                  (1) 
  To test the hypothesis that a reported obstacle is a binding constraint, that is, it has 
a significant impact on firm growth, we test whether β1  is significantly different from 
zero. Significant impact also requires that the obstacle has a value higher than one, which 
is true for all obstacles.   
Insert Table 2 here 
  The results in Table 2 show that when we analyze individual obstacles separately, 
most are significantly related to firm growth.  The only exceptions are Corruption, 
Exchange Rate, Anti-Competitive behavior, and Infrastructure obstacles which are not 
significantly related to firm growth. The regressions explain up to 7.4 percent of the 
variation in firm growth across countries.  The coefficients of the significant obstacles 
range from 0.021 for the Judicial Efficiency obstacle to 0.032 for the Finance Obstacle. 
Thus, firms that say financing is a minor obstacle grow 3.2% slower than those that say 
finance is not an obstacle or firms that say that finance is a moderate (major) obstacle 
grow 3.2% slower than those that say finance is a minor (moderate) obstacle.   12
Alternatively, in terms of standard deviation, a one standard deviation increase in the 
financing obstacle decreases firm growth rate by 3.6%.  
 In column 11, we include all the significant obstacles in the regression equation.  
In this specification, only Finance, Policy Instability and Crime obstacles have a 
significant constraining effect on growth. Dropping the remaining obstacles from the 
regression (which are jointly insignificant as well) as in specification 12 shows only 
Finance and Crime as having a constraining effect on growth. The economic impact of 
the Finance obstacle is higher than that of Crime but the difference is not statistically 
significant. 
It is also possible to do such impact evaluation at the regional level, at the country 
level or even at the firm level, instead of the sample mean we have used above.  Looking 
at the mean obstacles for individual countries reported in the Appendix Table A.1, it is 
clear that the binding obstacles are not equally important in every country.  For example, 
in  Singapore, where the mean value of the binding obstacles are all closer to one, the 
economic impact of the obstacles is much smaller compared to their impact in a country 
such as Nigeria, where the mean value of all three obstacles are over three, indicating 
severe constraints. Thus, it is possible to use these cross-country results to do growth 
diagnostics at the country level as discussed in Hausmann et al. (2004).  Going further 
down, there may also be some firms in Nigeria for which the constraints are not binding 
(depending on the value of the obstacles they report) and others in Singapore for which 
they are.  In fact, average values of obstacles by firm size as shown in Table 1 suggests 
that the three obstacles will always be more binding for smaller firms compared to larger 
firms.    13
Overall, these results suggest that the three obstacles- Finance, Crime and Policy 
Instability – are the only true constraints, in that they are the only obstacles that affect 
firm growth directly at the margin.  The other obstacles may also affect firm growth 
through their impact on each other and on the three binding constraints; however they 
have no direct effect on firm growth.    
Have we identified the key constraints? -  Robustness Checks 
We use the DAG methodology to check the robustness of our regression findings since 
DAG is useful in simplifying the set of independent variables in a systematic way as 
described in Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005).  
  The DAG analysis is implemented by the software program TETRAD III 
(Scheines, et al 1994). In keeping with common practice, we impose the following 
assumptions that are regularly used in the regression setting - the business environment 
obstacles cause firm growth, not the other way around, and the model contains all 
common causes of the variables in the model. To be consistent with the fixed effects 
specification in Table 2, we use demeaned values of the business environment obstacles 
where the country average of each obstacle is subtracted from the corresponding obstacle.  
  Figure 1 illustrates the application of this algorithm to our full sample. The input 
to the algorithm is the correlation matrix between firm growth and the ten demeaned 
business environment obstacles from the sample of 4197 firms. 
8 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Figure 1 shows that the only business environment obstacles that have a direct 
effect on firm growth are Financing, Crime and Policy Instability. Financing in turn is 
directly affected by the Taxes and Regulation obstacle which includes factors such as   14
taxes and tax administration, as well as regulations in the areas of business licensing, 
labor, foreign exchange, environment, fire and safety. Crime is directly affected by the 
Corruption obstacle and Policy Instability is affected by Corruption, Infrastructure, and 
Anticompetitive behavior
9. The dashed double-headed arrows between Policy Instability 
and the following variables – Crime, Inflation, Taxes and Regulation, and Judicial 
Efficiency – indicate that the direction of orientation between Policy Instability and these 
variables changes between patterns.  
The output also shows that relations between the obstacles themselves is quite 
complex and there are multiple relations in the DAG between the various business 
environment obstacles.
10 Since the main focus of this paper is to determine the business 
environment obstacles that have a direct effect on growth, we do not dwell on the 
interactions between the different variables and leave it for future work. Hence, rather 
than start at the bottom and focus on the farthest variable, which is likely to have a very 
diluted impact on firm growth, we start at the top of the agenda and focus on the variables 
with direct effects which are likely to have the biggest impact on growth. Most 
importantly, the DAG analysis also identifies only Financing, Crime and Policy Stability 
as having direct effects on firm growth, as suggested by specification 11 of Table 2. As 
discussed in Section II, the analysis identifies direct effects after conditioning on all 
subsets of the other variables. This suggests that in regression analysis, Financing, Crime 
and Policy Instability will always have significant coefficients irrespective of the subsets 
of other obstacles included in the regression. Thus, these are binding constraints, and 
policies that relax these constraints can be expected to directly increase firm growth.   
   15
Binding Constraints and Firm Size and Level of Development 
Next we explore if these relationships are different for firms of different sizes and at 
different levels of development. The first three columns of Table 3 include specifications 
that interact the three obstacles with firm size, given by the Logarithm of sales.  The 
interaction term with the Financing obstacle is positive and significant at one percent, 
suggesting that larger firms are less financially constrained, confirming the findings of 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005).  The interaction terms with Policy 
Instability and Crime are also positive but not significant. When we enter all the 
interactions together in specification (4), only the interaction term with the Financing 
obstacle is significant. Thus, although there is also some indication that large firms are 
also affected less by Crime and Policy Instability, this evidence is much weaker.  
Insert Table 3 here 
 We also interact the three obstacles with the following country income dummies 
- Upper Middle Income, Lower Middle Income and Low Income. The excluded category 
is High Income.  The results indicate that all three obstacles tend to be more constraining 
for middle income countries. This finding suggests that middle income countries having 
overcome country-specific institutional obstacles are now more constrained by a common 
set of obstacles pertaining to finance, crime, and policy instability. This is consistent with 
Gelb et al. (2007) who find that the extent to which firms complain on different obstacles 
differs according to the income level of the countries. The F-tests for the hypotheses that 
all the entered interactions are jointly equal to zero, are rejected at the one percent level 
of significance for Crime and Policy Instability obstacles but not for the Financing   16
obstacle. This suggests that firms in countries in all income groups are similarly affected 
by the Financing obstacle.  
Checking for Reverse Causality 
So far we have identified Financing, Crime, and Policy Instability as first order 
constraints, significantly affecting firm growth.  However, the relations we observe may 
also be due to reverse causality. This is most likely to bias the Financing obstacle result 
since it is easy to imagine that entrepreneurs might complain about restricted access to 
external finance even in cases where access is restricted due to their own deficiencies.  In 
the case of the Crime and Policy Instability obstacles, for reverse causality to be an issue 
it would have to be the case that inefficient slow growing firms blame the environment 
for their performance, in particular, the crime and policy instability. It is interesting 
however that only Financing, Crime, and Policy Instability consistently emerge as the 
first order constraints with the strongest association with firm growth. While reverse 
causality is potentially a concern it doesn’t explain why poorly performing firms 
systematically complain most about Financing, Crime, and Policy Instability and not 
about the other obstacles. While there might be a causal relation between poor 
performance and availability of financing, which we examine using instrumental 
variables below, it is harder to posit a causal relation between poor performance and 
crime and policy instability.   
As a check for reverse causality for the Street Crime and Policy Instability 
obstacles, we adopt the approach in Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright (2005) who 
recommend checking for causality by comparing the coefficients of the fixed effects 
within estimator and the between estimator and test for sign changes. They argue that   17
since reverse causality is more likely to be significant at the firm-level, it will cause the 
within estimator and the between estimator to change signs. 
11 When we run the fixed 
effects model using the within regression estimator on our data, we find the obstacle 
coefficients to be negative when entered individually. None of the coefficients are 
perversely positive that might have suggested reverse causality. The between effects 
estimator also shows the obstacle coefficients to be negative. 
Furthermore, as seen in Table 1, some factors such as Taxes & Regulation are 
rated very highly compared to other obstacles by firms but do not appear as binding 
constraints where as Street Crime which is not rated very highly (except in the case of 
Latin America) still emerges as one of the binding constraints. This suggests that firms 
may complain about many factors when surveyed but we need to control for country 
differences and firm heterogeneity to identify which obstacles have the largest 
association with firm growth.  
To assess the robustness of our results, we use instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions (limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimators) to extract the 
exogenous component of the three obstacles. We use two sets of instruments for 
Financing, Crime, and Policy Instability. First, we use the average value of the obstacles 
for the industry groups in each country.  While it is likely that individual firms may 
blame the different obstacles for their poor performance, it is less likely for all firms in a 
given country industry group to engage in such blame shifting. By instrumenting the 
obstacles with the average obstacle for each industry group in the country, we are 
isolating the exogenous part of the possibly endogenous obstacle the firm reports, and 
using that to predict growth. When we consider the obstacles at the country-industry level   18
of aggregation, the causality is likely to run from the average obstacles to individual 
firms, not vice versa. In addition, country-industry averages also helps us deal with 
potential measurement errors that are largely idiosyncratic to the firm and hence 
uncorrelated with average values of the obstacles. It may be noted that use of group 
averages as instruments is a common technique as used in Fisman and Svensson (2007) 
and described in Krueger and Angrist (2001). Second, we use firm responses to the 
survey question “Does your firm use international accounting standards?” A firm’s 
adoption of international accounting standards is likely to influence its business 
environment constraints, in particular the financing constraint, but is not necessarily 
linked to firm growth rates independently.  
Insert Table 4 here 
  We also do the analysis at the country level averaging the obstacle variables and 
firm growth rates across countries. Since we are performing the analysis at the country 
level, we control for Log GDP/capita and do not control for any of the firm level 
variables. As instruments for Financing and Policy Instability obstacles we use the 
country’s Common Law dummy that takes the value 1 if the country follows Common 
Law tradition and three religion variables, Protestant, Muslim, and Catholic that each 
represent the percentage of population that is Protestant, Muslim or Catholic respectively 
in each country. As an instrument for Street Crime, we use Common Law dummy and the 
Latitude of a country’s capital city. A huge literature has identified the above institutional 
variables to be a good instrument for institutional development and hence they are not 
used as explanatory variables in the short term growth regressions in the second stage.   19
  When we use country-industry averages of the obstacles as instruments (columns 
(1)-(3) in Panel A of Table 4) only the financing obstacle is negative and significant. The 
first stage F-statistic is large indicating that the country-industry average of the financing 
obstacle is a good instrument.
12 While the country-industry averages pass the test of 
instruments for policy instability and street crime, instrumenting these obstacles renders 
them insignificant in the regression. In addition, when we instrument all the three 
obstacles at once, as in column 4, we again find Financing to be the only significant 
constraint. This reinforces our finding that Financing is the most robust constraint of the 
three binding constraints.  
When we use firms’ adoption of international accounting standards as an 
instrument, we find that all three obstacles have a significant negative impact on firm 
growth. While the first stage F-statistics are significant in each case, it is greater than 10 
only for the Financing and Crime obstacles (Stock and Watson (2003) rule of thumb for 
good instruments). However, the Anderson Rubin Wald Test which is the preferred test 
for robust inference in the weak instrument case is rejected in all three cases suggesting 
that all three obstacles are individually important in affecting firm growth. We do not 
report overidentification tests since the equation is just identified in each case in panel A.   
Panel B presents cross-country regressions using historical institutional variables 
as instruments. Standard errors reported are robust standard errors. We find that all three 
obstacle variables are negative and significantly associated with firm growth. When we 
look at the various tests of instruments, while the first stage F-tests are significant at least 
at the 5% level in each case, the F-statistic is less than ten suggesting that the instruments 
may be weak. Hence we rely on the tests for robust inference under weak identification.   20
The Anderson Rubin Wald test of the null hypothesis that the obstacle coefficient is zero 
is rejected in all cases. In addition we also compute confidence intervals for these 
coefficients. Following Moreira and Poi (2001) and Mikusheva and Poi (2001) we obtain 
critical values of the likelihood ratio tests that yield correct rejection probabilities even 
when the instruments are weak. The confidence region and p-value for the coefficient on 
the obstacle variable based on the conditional likelihood show that the estimated 
coefficients belong to the confidence region. The underidentification test (Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald statistic) is rejected in each case indicating that the equation is identified 
and instruments pass the test of instrument relevance. The Hansen J statistic of 
overidentification is never rejected suggesting that the instruments used are valid 
instruments. In unreported results we control for a number of other country-level 
variables including growth rates, inflation, property rights protection, level of financial 
development and level of institutional development and find our results unchanged. 
Overall, using different sets of instruments at the firm level and country level our 
results suggest that there are exogenous components of Financing, Crime and Policy 
Instability obstacles that predict firm growth and the results we obtain are not due to 
reverse causality. The IV estimations also show that finance is once again the most robust 
of the binding obstacles. It must be noted however that it is very difficult to find perfect 
instruments at the level of the firm in cross-country regressions and hence some caveats 
regarding the instruments are in order. The country-industry averages of the instruments 
could potentially be correlated with the error term so we could have systematic 
differences in growth rates and firm complaints across country-industry groups that raises 
reverse causality concerns. Regarding the use of international accounting standards as an   21
instrument, in the absence of panel data we are unable to use firm fixed effects and hence 
there is always the risk that a firm’s adoption of accounting standards might be correlated 
with unobservables that affect firm growth. Finally, while the instruments in the country-
averages regressions can be considered to be exogenous since we are using historical 
institutional variables, there is the possibility of omitted variable bias in the absence of 
country fixed effects. 
Other Robustness 
In this section, we describe several robustness checks of our main findings. First we 
investigate whether our results are driven by a few countries or firms. In particular, we 
investigate two sets of countries: African and Transition economies. Chandra et al. (2001) 
suggest that firms in African countries may exhibit different responses than the other 
firms in the sample. A report by the United States General Accounting Office, GAO-04-
506 (2004) analyzes several firm level surveys on Africa, including the WBES, and 
concludes that perceptions of corruption levels vary greatly for African countries, proving 
a challenge for broad-based US Anticorruption Programs. Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2008) argue that Transition economies are fundamentally different from 
other countries in their perceptions of protection of property rights.  
Insert Table 5 here 
In the first four columns of Table 5 we run our preferred specification on different 
samples eliminating Transition and African countries. We find that while Financing and 
Crime are binding constraints as before, Policy Instability loses significance if we do not 
include these countries in the sample.  These results suggest that the type of Policy   22
Instability present in Transition and African economies is particularly damaging to firm 
expansion.   
We also noted that high inflation rates may be responsible for the very high firm 
growth rates we observe in some countries, particularly in Uzbekistan, Estonia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, constructing real firm growth rates and replicating all the 
analyses in this paper does not change the main results.  
To check whether our results are driven by specific outlier firms, we eliminate 
firms with very high growth rates (>100%). Firms reporting growth rates in excess of 
100%, are typically from the Transition and African countries and it is conceivable that 
these firms achieve high growth rates because of political connections and are not 
impacted by general business environment obstacles. Thus, the experience of these firms 
may differ from that of the typical firm. We find that Financing remains the most binding 
constraint to firm growth in our reduced sample, confirming that our results are not 
driven by the fastest growing firms in the sample. The impact of Crime on firm growth is 
less robust to eliminating high growth rate firms, however.   
It is also possible that young firms in the sample are affected differently by 
business environment obstacles.  Excluding all firms younger than five years old from the 
sample (results not reported) leaves the Financing result unchanged, while Crime and 
Policy Instability are not significant in the regressions. This suggests that policy stability 
and controlling crime are particularly important to ensure growth of younger firms. 
Financing is still the main binding constraint to growth when we use robust regression 
analysis or quantile regressions to control for the presence of possible influential outliers.    23
Below we report several other robustness checks of our main findings. The tables 
are available on request. First, in unreported regressions we separate out the variation at 
the firm level and variation at the country level. That is, we incorporate both the 
individual firm level effect of the obstacle (i.e. the demeaned value of the obstacle which 
is Obstacle minus the Country average of the obstacle) and the cross-country effect (i.e. 
the country average of the obstacle). We find that in the full specification including the 
firm level and country level effects of all the ten business environment obstacles, the only 
individual firm level obstacles that are binding constraints to growth are Financing, 
Policy Instability and Crime.  
We next perform various tests to detect outliers and influential points. We 
compute DFBETA statistics for each of the obstacle variables. The DFBETAs for 
regressor i measures the distance that this regression coefficient shifts when the j-th 
observation is included/excluded from the regression scaled by the estimated standard 
errors of the coefficient. None of the obstacles in our regressions have |DFBETA| >1 or 
even the stricter cutoff of |DFBETA|>2sqrt(N) as suggested by Besley, Kuh, and Welsch 
(1980). This implies that our results are not driven by influential observations. Financing 
and Crime have a significant negative effect on firm growth while Policy Instability is 
insignificant.
13 
We then control for growth opportunities using average industry growth or firm 
level dependence on external finance. The observed association between obstacles and 
firm growth might occur because firms that face higher obstacles are also those that face 
limited growth opportunities. Our results remain unchanged using either measure of 
growth opportunities. Financing, Policy Instability and Street Crime come in significant   24
when entered individually and when entered together, only Financing and Street Crime 
are significant. 
In unreported regressions, we also investigated whether firm ownership drives our 
results.  The sample includes 203 firms with government ownership. Excluding these 
firms leaves the Financing and Crime results unchanged.  The sample also includes 1340 
firms with over 50 percent foreign ownership.  Excluding these foreign firms from the 
analysis leaves only the Financing obstacle significant.  This suggests that foreign owned 
firms are particularly sensitive to Policy Instability and Crime.  Including dummy 
variables to control for government and foreign firms also leads to similar results in that 
only Financing and Crime are significant. 
Finally, we check if our results are robust subject to controlling for perception 
biases. Following Kaufmann and Wei (1999), we construct two kvetch variables, 
Kvetch1 and Kvetch2, which are deviations of each firm’s response from the mean 
country response to two general survey questions.  Kvetch1 uses the responses to the 
question “How helpful do you find the central government today towards businesses like 
yours?” and Kvetch2 is constructed using the responses to “How predictable are changes 
in economic and financial policies?”  Since higher values correspond to unfavorable 
responses, positive deviations from the country mean indicate pessimism whereas 
negative deviations indicate optimism. Controlling for differences in perceptions using 
the kvetch variables leaves only Financing and Crime results unchanged. Policy 
Instability remains insignificant. 
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Individual Financing Obstacles 
Our results indicate that Financing is one of the most important obstacles that directly 
constrain firm growth.   We would like to get a better understanding of exactly what type 
of obstacles related to financing are constraining firm growth. Fortunately, our survey 
data also includes more detailed questions regarding the Financing obstacles.   
To get at specific issues, the entrepreneurs were asked to rate the extent to which 
the following financing factors represent an obstacle to their growth: (i) collateral 
requirements of banks and financial institutions, (ii) bank paperwork and bureaucracy, 
(iii) high interest rates, (iv) need for special connections with banks and financial 
institutions, (v) banks lacking money to lend, (vi) access to foreign banks, (vii) access to 
non-bank equity, (viii) access to export finance, (ix) access to financing for leasing 
equipment, (x) inadequate credit and financial information on customers, and (xi) access 
to long-term loans.  The ratings are again on a scale of one to four, increasing in the 
severity of obstacles.  
Insert Table 6 here 
  Table 6 reports the regressions that parallel those in Table 2, but this time 
focusing on specific financing obstacles.  In addition to the individual financing 
obstacles, we also include a residual, the component of the general financing obstacle not 
explained by the individual obstacles. The results indicate that not all financing obstacles 
reported by firms are constraining.  Only the coefficients of collateral, paperwork, high 
interest rates, special connections, banks’ lack of money to lend, lease finance and the 
residual are significant when entered individually.  In terms of economic impact high 
interest rates has the highest impact – a one standard deviation increase in the obstacle   26
results in a decrease in firm growth by 3.3 percent. Unlike the different obstacles we 
examined above, specific financing obstacles are highly correlated with each other. In 
specification 13 we include all obstacles that are significant when entered individually, 
and find that only the high interest rates coefficient is significant, although only at the 
10% level.  If we also include the residual as in specification 14, only the residual 
remains significant.  The residual is likely to summarize how different firms are affected 
differently by the structure and ownership of the financial system, the level of 
competition and other factors which are not fully captured by the specific financial 
obstacles thus proxying for general access to credit.
14 
When we look at the correlations among obstacles using DAG analysis (not 
shown), we find that high interest rates is the only financial obstacle directly constraining 
firm growth. It may be noted that while we restrict the direction of causation to be from 
the various financing obstacles to growth, we impose no ordering amongst the individual 
financing obstacles themselves. The finding that high interest rates constrains firm 
growth is not surprising since the high interest rate obstacle captures the cost of financing 
and is itself an endogenous variable that depends on the ability of the financial system to 
satisfy the demand for capital. It can be expected to constrain all firms in all countries. 
Collectively, specific financing obstacles still do not capture everything measured by the 
general financing obstacle, as illustrated by the effect of the residual. This also suggests 
that the general access to credit is an important constraint for firms. 
  The DAG analysis also suggests that perceptions of high collateral requirements 
of banks and financial institutions and paperwork influence the perceptions of high 
interest rates.  High interest rates also influence perceptions of lack of access to lease   27
finance, banks lacking money to lend, as well as the need for special connections in 
banking.  In unreported results we also ran regressions of the high interest rate obstacle 
on individual financing obstacles. Specific financing obstacles are all individually 
correlated with high interest rates.  When we consider all financing obstacles together, 
only collateral, paperwork, special connections, lack of money to lend, and access to long 
term loans are correlated with high interest rates, as in the DAG analysis. 
 
 
IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
We use firm level survey data for 80 countries to investigate which features of the 
business environment are the most constraining for firm growth.   Specifically, we 
examine factors such as taxes and regulations, judicial efficiency, infrastructure 
weaknesses, and financing issues that have attracted significant attention in the literature.  
Although firms report many obstacles to their growth, not all of them are equally 
constraining – in that they either affect firm growth only indirectly through their 
influence on other factors, or not at all.  Using regressions as well as Directed Acyclic 
Graph (DAG) methodology, we find that only Finance, Crime and Policy Instability are 
binding constraints, which have a direct association with the growth rate of firms.  Thus, 
while other obstacles we study in this paper are also associated with firm growth, through 
their impact on each other and on direct obstacles, maintaining policy stability, keeping 
crime under control, and undertaking financial sector reforms to relax financing 
constraints are likely to be the most effective routes to promote firm growth. We also find 
that the Financing obstacle’s impact on growth is robust to varying samples of countries 
while the Policy Instability and Crime results are less robust to the exclusion of   28
Transition and African countries where they might be the most problematic for business 
growth.  We subject our results to a battery of robustness tests including changes in 
sample, controlling for reverse causality, growth opportunities and potential perception 
biases in survey responses. We find the financing obstacle to be the most robust to all 
these tests. This is further confirmed through instrumental variable regressions. This 
suggests that financial sector reform should be a priority for governments contemplating 
reform of their business environments.
15  
 Further  investigation  of  the Financing obstacles reveals the importance of high 
interest rates in constraining firm growth.  This result highlights the importance of 
macroeconomic policies in influencing growth at the firm level as indicated by the 
correlation between high interest rates and banks’ lack of money to lend.  Furthermore, 
high interest rates are also correlated with high collateral and paperwork requirements, 
the need for special connections with banks and unavailability of long term loans.  These 
results suggest that bureaucracy and corruption in banking, greater collateral 
requirements and lack of long term loans are common in high interest rate environments.   
In addition to the cost of financing, we also find that general access to credit is an 
important constraint to firm growth. We leave further investigation of country and firm 
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Appendix Table A.1: General Obstacles 
 



















Albania 0.22  103  3.04  3.48  2.75  2.61  2.69  3.42  3.34  3.15  2.72  3 
Argentina 0.08  82  3.01  3.07  1.77  1.73  2.27  2.39  2.58  3.34  2.41  1.93 
Armenia -0.2  96  2.45  2.87  2.73  2.69  1.5  1.85  1.96  3.39  1.9  1.77 
Azerbaijan -0.2  70  3.11  2.55  2.9  2.61  2.59  2.39  3  3.17  2.96  2.43 
Bangladesh 0.13  34  2.6  3.08  2.86  3.09  2.38  3.07  3.61  3.03  2.4   
Belarus 0.1  97  3.33  2.95  3.63  3.16  1.55  2.17  1.88  3.34  1.99  1.7 
Belize 0.12  26  2.81  2.38  2.04  1.73  1.56  2.12  1.96  2.77  1.96  2.19 
Bolivia 0.04  80  3.03  3.1  2.58  2.46  2.78  2.76  3.56  3.15  2.71  2.63 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  0.63  76  3.09  3.19  1.33  1.25  2.54  1.86  2.56  3.16  2.58  2.65 
Botswana 0.32  72  2.24  1.55  1.93  1.33    1.88  1.65  1.89    2.16 
Brazil 0.03  148  2.67  3.53  2.8  2.94  2.56  2.83  2.53  3.66  2.49  2.18 
Bulgaria 0.15  101  3.16  3.03  2.76  2.37  2.26  2.64  2.64  3.1  2.34  2.23 
Cambodia 0.07  298  2.04  2.9  2.61  2.32  2  3.29    2.23  2.21  2.33 
Cameroon 0.12  44  3.14  2.03  2.03  2.28    2.94  3.36  2.7    3.44 
Canada 0.17  74  2.1  2.18  2.15  2.16  1.47  1.32  1.4  2.59  1.62  1.41 
Chile 0.09  81  2.36  2.58  2.16  2.59  1.97  2.4  1.86  2.36  1.91  1.86 
China 0.05  70  3.36  2.1  2.23  1.83  1.5  1.83  1.94  2.03  2.13  1.89 
Colombia 0.06  83  2.67  3.49  3.01  3.34  2.4  3.37  2.87  3.17  2.33  2.46 
Costa Rica  0.25  81  2.62  2.67  2.93  2.75  2.2  2.89  2.52  2.8  2.44  2.63 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.05  47  2.78  2.85  2.37  1.97    3.29  3.24  2.49    2.29 
Croatia 0.1  97  3.26  3.11  2.47  2.86  2.74  2.09  2.59  3.34  2.04  1.94 
Czech Republic  0.1  80  3.18  2.95  3  2.46 2.18 2.09  2.1 3.44 2.16  2.5 
Dominican Republic  0.21  95  2.63  3.02  2.85  2.88  2.43  3.22  3  3.96  2.75  2.63 
Ecuador -0.06  74  3.27  3.6  3.76  3.78  3.04  3.49  3.53  3.07  2.55  2.67 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.16  44  2.91  3.14  2.68  2.9    2.24  3.14  3.43    3.23 
El Salvador  -0.02  73  2.93  2.97  3.16  2.55  2.65  3.67  3.06  2.93  2.36  2.52 
Estonia 0.63  109  2.47  2.62  2.41  1.89  1.72  2.09  1.88  2.67  1.85  1.64 
Ethiopia 0.26  70  3.02  2.38  2.26  2.47    1.51  2.46  2.33    3.04   30





of firms  Financing  
Policy 











Behavior  Infrastructure 
France 0.2  62  2.61  2.2  2.03  1.82  1.79  1.77  1.62  3.13  2.02  1.81 
Georgia 0.14  78  3.29  2.84  3.29  2.94  1.86  2.32  3.04  3.22  2.18  2.14 
Germany 0.11  60  2.59  1.63  1.87  1.64  2.12  1.56  1.88  3.17  2.3  1.71 
Ghana 0.19  58  3.1  2.37  3.43  2.58    2.37  2.78  2.83    2.74 
Guatemala 0.18  84  2.99  3.16  3.32  3.6  2.5  3.22  2.7  2.75  2.28  2.52 
Haiti 0  62  3.28  3.18  2.92  2.9  2.35 3.81 3.08  2.73 3.1  3.89 
Honduras 0.1  65  2.97  2.53  3.41  3.3  2.41  3.23  2.9  2.83  2.79  2.56 
Hungary 0.28  98  2.6  2.61  2.59  1.6  1.32  1.76  1.95  3.01  2.14  1.53 
India 0.15  152  2.59  2.81  2.77  2.42  2.02  1.98  2.8  2.43    2.8 
Indonesia -0.05  70  2.83  3.14  3.21  3.4  2.26  2.69  2.69  2.59  2.96  2.37 
Italy 0.16  64  1.97  2.97  2.23  1.83  2.22  2.22  1.76  3.25  2.19  2.24 
Kazakhstan 0.1  89  3.29  2.88  3.62  3.48  2.08  2.6  2.7  3.37  2.55  2.1 
Kenya 0.03  70  2.76  3.03  2.8  1.75    3.27  3.56  2.53    3.64 
Kyrgyz Republic  0  68  3.47  3.23  3.78  3.48  2.13  3.26  3.19  3.59  3  1.98 
Lithuania 0.08  68  3.03  2.27  2.3  1.91  2.25  2.52  2.44  3.26  2.31  1.82 
Madagascar 0.16  67  3.08  2.67  3.32  2.3    2.79  3.44  2.75    3.03 
Malawi 0.64  30  2.81  2.2  3.56  2.54    3.08  2.65  2.37    3.76 
Malaysia 0.01  37  2.57  2.14  2.44  1.94  1.63  1.78  2  2.03  1.91  1.92 
Mexico 0.24  71  3.24  3.27  3.48  3.13  2.77  3.37  3.31  3.21  2.75  2.23 
Moldova -0.15  84  3.42  3.6  3.86  3.51  2.51  3.11  2.93  3.58  2.93  2.64 
Namibia 0.3  52  2  1.66  2.08  2.08    1.96  1.71  1.98    1.63 
Nicaragua 0.21  76  3.05  2.91  3.39  3.07  2.33  2.8  2.88  2.96  2.42  2.71 
Nigeria 0.26  63  3.11  3.43  3.21  2.92    3.3  3.37  3.1    3.68 
Pakistan 0.05  61  3.28  3.64  3.21  2.87  2.56  3.03  3.54  3.2  2.67  3.08 
Panama 0.09  81  2.06  2.72  2.04  1.42  2.4  2.98  2.8  2.38  2.44  2.19 
Peru -0.02  83  3.09  3.21  2.85  2.99  2.55  2.81  2.83  3.35  2.68  2.27 
Philippines 0.07  84  2.69  2.85  3.36  3.43  2.24  2.8  3.13  3.08  2.9  2.88 
Poland 0.33  175  2.47  2.75  2.58  2.27  2.3  2.37  2.27  3.08  2.23  1.67 
Portugal 0.12  52  1.8  2.08  2.1  1.74  1.88  1.64  1.73  2.15  2.18  1.75   31
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Romania 0.07  96  3.26  3.44  3.75  3.19  2.59  2.45  2.88  3.57  2.52  2.44 
Russian Federation  0.29  384  3.2  3.49  3.53  3.15  2.17  2.65  2.62  3.58  2.67  2.12 
Senegal 0.15  38  3  2.21  2.56  2    2.61  3.04  2.97    2.88 
Singapore 0.12  74  1.97  1.5  1.61  1.88  1.32  1.22  1.28  1.55  1.58  1.42 
Slovak Republic  0.14  91  3.34  1.53  3.13  2.43  2.13  2.49  2.47  3.25  2.26  1.98 
Slovenia 0.29  101  2.3  2.6  2.23  2.21  2.29  1.68  1.64  2.91  2.43  1.74 
South Africa  0.26  87  2.34  1.97  2.45  2.39    3.58  2.58  2.64    1.83 
Spain 0.25  66  2.21  2.17  2.27  1.93  1.97  1.92  2.08  2.65  2.25  1.94 
Sweden 0.23  73  1.83  2.46  1.66  1.78  1.46  1.54  1.18  2.67  1.97  1.52 
Tanzania 0.25  40  2.85  2.48  2.65  2.07    1.96  2.88  2.7    3.21 
Thailand -0.02  337  3.1  3.49  3.4  3.62  2.13  3.48  3.47  3.54  3.6  2.76 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.18  80  3.03  1.81  2.49  2.41  1.45  2.18  1.68  2.78  1.79  2.1 
Tunisia 0.14  41  1.79  1.94  1.7  1.94    1.55  2.11  2.12    2.1 
Turkey 0.1  115  3.12  3.55  3.61  2.83  2.3  2.09  2.89  3.16  2.79  2.22 
Uganda 0.18  67  3.17  2.47  2.68  1.78    2.27  2.93  2.48    2.81 
Ukraine 0.03  170  3.45  3.22  3.43  3.05  2.16  2.49  2.51  3.7  2.86  2.22 
United Kingdom  0.27  62  2.33  2.19  2.16  2.28  1.5  1.95  1.24  2.87  1.72  1.69 
United States  0.16  66  2.38  2.05  2.12  1.71  1.84  2.14  1.88  2.39  1.7  1.83 
Uruguay 0  72  2.73  2.61  2.03  2.39  1.91  2.07  2  3.21  1.71  1.9 
Uzbekistan 0.64  94  2.77  2.03  3.04  2.6  1.68  1.77  2.22  2.66  2.28  1.95 
Venezuela -0.02  78  2.62  3.64  3.48  3.12  2.65  3.18  3  3.1  2.63  2.31 
Zambia 0.18  46  2.95  2.57  3.45  1.88    3.18  2.78  2.39    3.07 
Zimbabwe 0.47  91  3.05  2.73  3.83  2.93    2.57  2.87  2.87    2.53 
Average  0.15 86.73  2.8 2.72  2.76  2.49  2.15  2.51 2.56  2.9  2.37  2.34 
 
Note: The variables are described as follows: Firm growth is the percentage change in firm sales over the past three years (1996-99). Financing, Policy Instability, Inflation, Exchange Rate, Judicial 
Efficiency, Street Crime, Corruption, Taxes and Regulation, Anti-competitive Behavior and Infrastructure are general obstacles as indicated in the firm questionnaire. They take values 1 to 4, with 
higher values indicating greater obstacles. Firm obstacles are averaged over all firms in each country. The number of firms reported are the firms with non-missing firm growth rates.  
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in  the text.  32
                                                 
1 Fleisig (1996) highlights the problem with posting collateral in developing and transition countries with 
the example of financing available to Uruguayan farmers raising cattle. While cattle are viewed as one of 
the best forms of loan collateral by the US, a pledge on cattle is worthless in Uruguay. Uruguayan law 
requires for specific description of the pledged property, in this case, an identification of the cows pledged. 
The need to identify collateral so specifically undermines the secured transaction since the bank is not 
allowed to repossess a different group of cows in the event of nonpayment. 
2 There is a parallel literature on financial development and growth at the country level.  Specifically, cross-
country studies (King and Levine 1993; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000) 
show that financial development fosters economic growth.  Also see Levine (2005) for a review of the 
finance and growth literature. 
3 See Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2004), Gelb, Ramachandran, Shah, and Turner (2007), 
Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright (2005) and Svejnar and Commander (2007). 
4In the survey managers indicate that an obstacle is a problem by assigning a value greater than one, on a 
four point scale to that obstacle. The significance of the coefficient in the growth regression is usually 
sufficient to determine whether an obstacle is binding or not since the mean value of all obstacles exceeds 
one.  However, in determining the relative impact, it is important to take into account the level of the 
obstacles.  
5 DAG analysis is related to the use of different analytical methods to identify the most reliable predictors 
of economic growth such as the Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) used in Kormendi and Meguire (1985), 
Barro (1991), and Levine and Renelt (1992) and the technique in Sala-i-Martin (1997). DAG analysis has 
several advantages over these methods. While these methods start from an equation specified by the 
researcher, that embodies a causal ordering which is then tested, DAG can endogenously discover the 
causal ordering.  Moreover, whereas EBA treats one relation at a time, the graphs produced by DAG show 
robust relations between all the variables being analyzed, taking into account the implications of robust 
relations elsewhere in the system on the ordering in a specific relation.   33
                                                                                                                                                 
6 The survey provides two obstacles on crime, one capturing street crime and the other organized crime.  
Since the correlation between the two obstacles is higher than 70 percent, we use only street crime in our 
analysis, which is also more strongly correlated with firm growth among the two. 
7 In unreported regressions we also checked the robustness of our results to including additional control 
variables in the regression.  Specifically, adding variables at the firm level capturing a firm’s industry, 
number of competitors, organizational structure, and whether it is government or foreign owned, an 
exporter, or a subsidy receiver reduces country coverage from 80 to 56, but does not affect the results 
significantly for individual obstacles.  Of the three binding constraints identified above, only the Policy 
Instability obstacle loses significance. We get similar results with country random effects controlling for 
GDP/Capita and inflation at the country level.   
8 In addition, we select the significance level for the tests of conditional independence performed by 
TETRAD. Because the algorithm performs a complex sequence of statistical tests, each at the given 
significance level, the significance level is not an indication of error probabilities of the entire procedure. 
Spirtes, Glymour, and Sheines (1993) after exploring several versions of the algorithm on simulated data 
conclude that “in order for the method to converge to correct decisions with probability 1, the significance 
level used in making decisions should decrease as the sample size increases, and the use of higher 
significance levels may improve performance at small sample sizes.” For the results in this paper obtained 
from samples ranging from 2659-4197 observations, we use a significance level of 0.10. At the 5% 
significance level, Finance, Crime, and Policy Instability have a direct effect on firm growth where as at the 
1% level only Finance and Crime have a direct effect on growth. 
9 We find the DAG analysis and the set of causal structures determined by the algorithm as being useful for 
an objective selection of variables, with the heuristic interpretation that if DAG analysis shows that 
obstacle X causes obstacle Y, then firms’ reports of X as an obstacle is also likely to affect the probability 
that they report of Y as an obstacle. For details refer to formal definitions.  
10 In addition to the directed arrows and bi-directional arrows, Figure 1 also shows that in some cases 
common latent causes drive association between some variables (e.g. financing and corruption) and in other 
cases, the direction of orientation is inconsistent i.e. some statistical tests indicate that an edge should be 
oriented as x1Æ x2, and other statistical tests indicate that it should be oriented as x1←x2.   34
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright (2005) argue that only in the case of the financing constraint, reverse 
causality makes the within coefficient more negative than the true value, thus making this method 
inapplicable 
12 This is further confirmed by the Weak Identification test statistic (Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic) which 
is much larger than the critical value of 16.38 
13 In unreported results we also computed the DFITS statistic of Welsch and Kuh (1977) which identifies 
the influence of each observation on the fitted model. Besley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) suggest that a cutoff 
of |DFITSj| > 2sqrt(k/N) indicates influential observations where k is the number of estimated coefficients 
and N is the number of observations. We have 145 observations in our sample with |DFITS| greater than the 
cutoff value. When we drop these influential observations we find that Financing, Policy Instability, and 
Crime are all negative and significant 
14 The residual remains significant if in addition to the residual and the significant individual financing 
obstacles (collateral, paperwork, high interest rates, special connections, lack money to lend and lease 
finance), we were to include all the general obstacles (Policy Instability, Crime, Inflation, Exchange rates, 
Taxes & Regulation, Anti-Competitive Behavior, Judicial Efficiency, Corruption and Infrastructure). 
15 An implicit assumption with the use of any survey data is that firm managers are knowledgeable about 
the different obstacles and understand the true workings of the financial and legal systems.  
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Table 1: Economic Indicators and General Obstacles 
Panel A: Averaged Across Countries 


















Behavior  Infrastructure 
               
Panel A: Averaged Across Country Income Groups                               
High (N=11)  21376.34  0.19  2.19  2.2  2.04  1.93  1.81  1.71  1.59  2.67  2  1.72 
Upper-Middle (N=18)  4131.817  0.19  2.75  2.62  2.54  2.27  2.13  2.38  2.29  2.93  2.18  1.99 
Lower-Middle (N=26)  1984.852  0.11  3  3.14  3.1  2.94  2.31  2.72  2.73  3.24  2.59  2.31 
Low Income (N=25)  435.3  0.14  2.85  2.84  3.02  2.61  2.15  2.78  2.98  2.73  2.53  2.7 
               
Panel B: Averaged Across 5 Geographic Regions                               
Europe and North 
America (N=9)  22863.72  0.19  2.2  2.22  2.06  1.89  1.79  1.78  1.63  2.77  1.98  1.76 
Latin America (N=20)  3022.2  0.09  2.83  3.02  2.84  2.8  2.39  2.95  2.74  3.01  2.43  2.4 
Asia (N=10)  2772.52  0.05  2.59  2.82  2.74  2.66  1.99  2.62  2.71  2.51  2.44  2.43 
Transition (N=23)  2417.02  0.19  3.05  2.99  3.06  2.7  2.17  2.39  2.5  3.28  2.44  2.09 
Africa (N=18)  1115.81  0.23  2.77  2.43  2.75  2.21     2.64  2.80  2.32     2.75 
               
Panel C: Averaged Across 3 Size Groups                               
Small 3759.33  0.13  2.89  2.84  2.90  2.59  2.13  2.64  2.62  2.94  2.43  2.24 
Medium 4377.98  0.16  2.86  2.87  2.84  2.60  2.18  2.46  2.53  3.00  2.41  2.26 
Large 4365.68  0.17  2.54  2.75  2.65  2.55  2.19  2.49  2.43  2.70  2.23  2.36 
Note: The variables are described as follows: GDP per capita is real GDP per capita in US dollars averaged over 1995-1999. Firm growth is the percentage change in firm sales over the past three years 
(1996-99). Financing, Policy Instability, Inflation, Exchange Rate, Judicial Efficiency, Street Crime, Corruption, Taxes and Regulation, Anti-competitive Behavior and Infrastructure are general 
obstacles as indicated in the firm questionnaire. They take values 1 to 4, with higher values indicating greater obstacles. In Panel A, the countries are classified into High Income, Upper Middle Income, 
Lower Middle Income and Low Income group countries according to WDI and firm variables are averaged over all firms in the particular group of countries. In Panel B, the countries are classified into 
five geographic regions and firm variables are averaged over all firms in the particular geographic region. In Panel C, firm variables are averaged across three size groups-Small, Medium and Large 
Firms.  
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
 
 Table 2: Firm Growth-Impact of Obstacles 
126385749 1 0 1 1 1 2
Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth Firm Growth
Constant 0.205*** 0.165*** 0.193*** 0.170*** 0.180*** 0.140*** 0.152*** 0.117*** 0.111*** 0.126*** 0.332*** 0.297***
(0.028) (0.036) (0.034) (0.029) (0.040) (0.026) (0.032) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.059) (0.047)
Size 0.003 0.005** 0.004 0.004 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.003 0.005* 0.005* 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Financing -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.028***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Policy Instability -0.024** -0.022* -0.014
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009)




Tax Regulation -0.027** 0.001
(0.012) (0.013)











N 6235 6133 5964 6175 6343 5142 5620 6068 5091 6205 4551 5778
NCountries 79 79 79 79 79 61 78 79 60 79 59 78
Adjusted. R-sq 0.07 0.073 0.07 0.068 0.069 0.07 0.072 0.069 0.069 0.068 0.074 0.072  
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
Note: The regression equation estimated is: Firm Growth = α + β1 Size+ β2 Financing + β3Policy Instability + β4Inflation + β5Exchange Rates+ β6Judicial Efficiency + β7Street Crime+ β8Corruption + 
β9Taxes and Regulation+ β10 Anti-competitive Behavior + β11 Infrastructure + β12Country Fixed Effects+ e. The variables are described as follows: Firm Growth is the percentage increase in firm sales 
over the past three years. Firm Size is the Log of firm sales. Financing, Policy Instability, Inflation, Exchange Rate, Judicial Efficiency, Street Crime, Corruption, Taxes and Regulation, Anti-
competitive Behavior and Infrastructure are general obstacles as indicated in the firm questionnaire. They take values 1 to 4, where 1 indicates no obstacle and 4 indicates major obstacle. In 
specifications (1) to (10), each of the obstacle variables is included individually. Specification 11 includes all the obstacles that were significant in (1) to (10) together where as in specification 12 only 
Financing, Policy Instability and Street Crime obstacles are entered. All regressions in specifications 1-12 are estimated using country fixed effects with clustered standard errors.   
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text.   41
Table 3: Firm Growth-Interaction Effects 
  Interaction with Firm Size  Interaction with Country Income Dummies 
    1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
   Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth 
Constant  0.278*** 0.218*** 0.225*** 0.421*** 0.207*** 0.177*** 0.184*** 0.299*** 
  (0.050) (0.061) (0.058) (0.089) (0.029) (0.039) (0.030) (0.046) 
Firm Size  -0.004  -0.000  -0.000  -0.009  0.004  0.005*  0.004  0.004 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Financing  -0.058***     -0.053***  -0.002     -0.004 
  (0.016)     (0.015)  (0.013)     (0.015) 
Financing*Size  0.003***     0.003**      
  (0.001)     (0.001)      
Financing*Upper  Middle       -0.041*     -0.034 
       (0.023)     (0.022) 
Financing*Lower  Middle       -0.041**     -0.027 
       (0.019)     (0.019) 
Financing*Low  Income       -0.016     -0.019 
       (0.019)     (0.022) 
Policy Instability    -0.042**    -0.024    0.008    0.014 
   (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Policy  Instability*Size    0.002    0.001      
    (0.001)    (0.001)      
Policy Instability*Upper Middle            -0.056***    -0.045** 
           (0.021)    (0.018) 
Policy Instability*Lower Middle            -0.055**    -0.043* 
           (0.024)    (0.025) 
Policy Instability*Low Income            0.005    -0.008 
           (0.019)    (0.017) 
Street Crime      -0.042*  -0.034      -0.010  -0.014 
     (0.024)  (0.025)    (0.014)  (0.014) 
Street  Crime*Size     0.001  0.001      
     (0.001)  (0.002)      
Street Crime*Upper Middle              -0.021  -0.010 
         (0.026)  (0.025) 
Street Crime*Lower Middle              -0.052**  -0.039 
         (0.025)  (0.027) 
Street  Crime*Low  Income         0.039*  0.044** 
         (0.021)  (0.020)   42
  Interaction with Firm Size  Interaction with Country Income Dummies 
    1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
   Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth 
N  6235 6133 5964 5778 6235 6133 5964 5778 
NCountries  79 79 79 78 79 79 79 78 
Adjusted  R-Square  0.071 0.074 0.071 0.074 0.070 0.075 0.073 0.075 
F-Test of Interactions        0.0503  0.1184  0.0088  0.0039  0.0022 
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
Note: The regression equation estimated is: Firm Growth = α + β1 Size + β2 Financing + β3 Policy Instability + β4 Street Crime+ β5 Financing x Income Dummies + β6 Financing x Size + β7 Policy 
Instability x Income Dummies + β8 Policy Instability x Size+ β9 Street Crime x Income Dummies + β10 Street Crime x Size. The variables are described as follows: Firm Growth is the percentage 
increase in firm sales over the past three years.  Firm Size is the log of sales. Financing, Policy Instability and Street Crime are general obstacles as indicated in the firm questionnaire. They take values 1 
to 4, where 1 indicates no obstacle and 4 indicates major obstacle. Income dummies are country dummies created on the basis of income level of the country. High Income Dummy takes the value 1 for 
countries belonging to the high income group and 0 otherwise, Upper Middle Income dummy takes the value 1 for countries belonging to the upper middle income group and 0 otherwise, Lower Middle 
Income dummy takes the value 1 for countries belonging to the lower middle income group and 0 other wise, Low Income dummy takes the value 1 for low income group countries and 0 otherwise. In 
specifications (1) to (3) in each panel, the obstacle variables and its interactions is included individually. Specification 4 in both panels includes the full model.  All regressions are estimated using 
country fixed effects with clustered standard errors. Each specification also reports the p-value of the joint significance test of the interaction terms.  
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Table 4: Robustness Test-Instrumental Variables 
Panel A: Firm Level Regressions 
















Instrument(s)  Country-Industry Average of the obstacle variable  Does the firm follow international accounting standards? 
Size 0.002  0.006***  0.004*  0.003  -0.004  0.011*  -0.005 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Financing  -0.066***     -0.067** -0.285***    
  (0.025)     (0.028)  (0.101)    
Policy  Instability   -0.045   -0.041    -0.897*   
   (0.029)   (0.031)   (0.499)  
Street  Crime     -0.011  0.014     -0.529** 
     (0.029)  (0.032)     (0.232) 
N  6235 6133 5964  5778  5846 5747 5592 
First Stage Test of Excluded Instruments                   
F-Stat (Financing) 
382.32 




(0.0000)    
F-Stat (Policy Instability)   
334.57 
(0.0000)   
106.44 
(0.0000)   
4.66 
(0.0309)   




(0.0000)    
11.11 
(0.0009) 
Underidentification Test  















Weak Instrument Robust Inference 

















Panel B: Cross-country regressions 
   1  2  3 
   Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth 
Instruments 
Common law dummy, 3 
religion dummies 
Common law dummy, 3 
religion dummies 
Common law dummy, 
Latitude 
Constant 2.385**  1.122***  1.206*** 
 (1.013)  (0.344)  (0.465) 
GDP/Capita -0.091**  -0.031*  -0.052*   44
   1  2  3 
   Firm Growth  Firm Growth  Firm Growth 
Instruments 
Common law dummy, 3 
religion dummies 
Common law dummy, 3 
religion dummies 
Common law dummy, 
Latitude 
 (0.043)  (0.016)  (0.029) 
Financing -0.556**     
 (0.255)     
Policy  Instability   -0.270***  
   (0.093)  
Street Crime      -0.264*** 
     (0.102) 
















Weak Instruments Robust Inference  
 














Overidentification Test of all Instruments 







*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
Note: Two stage instrumental variable regressions are used. In Panel A, the first stage regression equation estimated is Financing (or Policy Instability or Street Crime) = α + γ1 Country Fixed Effects + γ 
2 Firm Size + γ 3 Instrument. The second stage regression equation estimated is: Firm Growth = α + β1 Country Fixed Effects + β2 Firm Size+ β3 Financing (predicted value from first stage) + β4Policy 
Instability (predicted value from first stage) + β5 Street Crime (predicted value from first stage). In specifications (1)-(4), the instrument used is the average value of the obstacle across each industry in 
each country. In specifications (5)-(7), the instrument used is firm response to the variable “Does the firm adopt international accounting standards?”. 
Panel B reports cross-country regressions with robust standard errors. The first stage regression equation estimated is Financing (or Policy Instability or Street Crime) averaged across countries = α + γ1 
Common Law dummy + γ 2 Latitude + γ 3 Protestant + γ 4 Catholic + γ 5 Muslim + γ 6 GDP/Capita + e. The second stage regression equation estimated is: Firm Growth = α + β1 GDP/Capita + β2 
Financing (predicted value from first stage) + β3Policy Instability (predicted value from first stage) + β4 Street Crime (predicted value from first stage.  The variables are described as follows: Firm 
Growth is the percentage increase in firm sales over the past three years. Firm Size is the Log of Sales. GDP/capita is log of real GDP per capita in US$. Financing, Policy Instability, and Street Crime 
are general obstacles as indicated in the firm questionnaire. They take values 1 to 4, where 1 indicates no obstacle and 4 indicates major obstacle. English Common Law is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for Common Law Countries. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of the country scaled between zero and one. Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim variables are the percentage of 
protestant, catholic and muslim religions in each country from La Porta et al. (1997).  Does the firm adopt international accounting standards  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm adopts 
international accounting standards and 0 otherwise.  
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text.   45
Table 5: Robustness Test -Varying Samples 
 
High Growth Firms Included  High Growth Firms Excluded 













































Constant  0.227*** 0.307*** 0.233***  0.226***  0.172***  0.225*** 0.175***  0.236***  0.165*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.028)  (0.039) (0.029)  (0.042)  (0.028) 
Firm Size  -0.000 0.005 0.000  0.004  0.003  0.001 0.003  0.000  0.003 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
-0.012*  -0.033*** -0.020***  -0.019***  -0.018***  -0.017*** -0.020***  -0.022***  -0.016***  Financing 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
-0.007 -0.015* -0.010  -0.008  -0.015***  -0.011  -0.015** -0.010  -0.014***  Policy Instability 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.007) (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
-0.016** -0.027***  -0.020***  -0.021***  -0.007  -0.018***  -0.008  -0.020***  -0.009*  Street Crime 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006) (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
N  3224 5236 2682  5534  5631  3202 5107  2678  5421 
NCountries  54 62 38  75  78  54 62  38  75 
Adjusted R-Square  0.073 0.072 0.056  0.053  0.086  0.074 0.082  0.068  0.084 
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
Note: The regression equation estimated is: Firm Growth = α + β1 GDP/capita + β2 Size+ β3 Financing + β4Policy Instability + β5 Street Crime. The variables are described as follows: Firm Growth is the 
percentage increase in firm sales over the past three years. GDP/capita is log of real GDP per capita in US$. Firm Size is the Log of firm sales. Financing, Policy Instability, and Street Crime are general 
obstacles as indicated in the firm questionnaire. They take values 1 to 4, with where 1 indicates no obstacle and 4 indicates major obstacle. Specifications (1) to (4) exclude certain countries from the full 
sample of firms while specifications (5) to (9) exclude the countries from a reduced sample which does not include firms reporting very high(/low) growth rates (>+/-100%). All regressions are 
estimated using country fixed effects with clustered standard errors.   
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Table 6: Firm Growth-Impact of Individual Financing Obstacles 
 






























Constant  0.180***  0.172***  0.211***  0.132***  0.166*** 0.158*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.106*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.094***  0.264*** 0.212*** 
  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.034) (0.028) (0.040) (0.039) (0.034) (0.036) (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.040)  (0.048) 
Firm  Size  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005  0.005*  0.004  0.005*  0.006* 0.002  0.005 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Collateral  -0.023***                  -0.006  -0.008 
  (0.007)                  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Paperwork    -0.025***                -0.010  -0.015 
    (0.009)                (0.010)  (0.011) 
High 
Interest 
Rates      -0.032***              -0.020*  -0.011 
      (0.010)              (0.011)  (0.012) 
Special 
Connections        -0.015**            -0.001  -0.002 
        (0.007)            (0.010)  (0.014) 
Lack Money 
to  lend          -0.024***          -0.011  -0.007 
          (0.008)          (0.009)  (0.012) 
Lease 
Finance            -0.015           
            (0.009)           
Access to 
foreign 
banks              -0.002          
              (0.007)          
Access to 
non-bank 
equity               -0.005         
               (0.008)          
Export 
Finance                0.004        
                (0.009)        
Credit                 0.003       
                 (0.007)       
Long Term 
Loans                  -0.008      
                  (0.008)        47































Residual                   -0.022**    -0.023** 
                   (0.011)    (0.011) 
N  6024  6133  6298  6002  5808  5076 5093 5037 4440 5332 5030 2988  5317 2988 
NCountries  79  79  79  79  79  78 78 78 78 78 60 58  79 58 
Adj.  R-sq  0.070  0.069  0.070  0.064  0.074 0.070 0.065 0.070 0.071 0.072 0.068  0.006  0.071  0.065 
 *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
Note: The regression equation estimated is: Firm Growth = α + β1 Size+ β2 Collateral + β3Paperwork + β4High Interest Rates + β5 Special Connections+ β6 Lack money to lend+ β7 Access to foreign 
banks + β8 Access to non-bank equity+ β9 Export finance + β10 Lease finance + β11Credit + β12 Long Term Loans + β13 (Residual). The variables are described as follows: Firm Growth is the percentage 
increase in firm sales over the past three years. Firm Size is the Log of Sales. Collateral, Paperwork, High Interest Rates, Special Connections, Lack money to lend, Access to foreign banks, Access to 
non-bank equity, Export finance, Lease finance, Credit, Long Term Loans are individual financing obstacles as indicated in the firm questionnaire. They take values 1 to 4, with where 1 indicates no 
obstacle and 4 indicates major obstacle. In specifications (1) to (11), each of the obstacle variables is included individually. Residual is the residual from a regression of the General Financing Obstacle 
on all the individual financing obstacles. Specification 13 includes Collateral, Paperwork, High Interest Rates, Special Connections, Lack money to lend, and Lease Finance. Specifications 12 and 14 
include the Financing Residual. All regressions are estimated using country fixed effects with clustered standard errors.  
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 